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PRELIMINARY REPORT 
 
Introduction 
 
 This is a Preliminary Report of an Assessment of labor practices at Primo S.A. de 
C.V. (“Primo”)1 an American-owned apparel factory in El Salvador that currently 
employs 5,000 workers, most of whom are young women. 
Primo produces goods that bear the logos of numerous Universities affiliated with 
the Worker Rights Consortium, under licensing agreements between these Universities 
and Lands’ End, a well-known catalog retailer recently purchased by Sears.  Primo is 
located in the San Bartolo free trade zone in San Salvador, one of a number of export 
processing zones administered by the Salvadoran government.   
 The Worker Rights Consortium initiated this Assessment in response to 
allegations, which, if true, would constitute serious violations of Codes of Conduct of the 
WRC and its affiliated schools, including those Code provisions requiring compliance 
with Salvadoran and International Labor Law.  These allegations were contained in a 
complaint to the WRC from a Salvadoran non-governmental organization, Centro de 
Estudios y Apoyo Laboral (Center for Research and Advocacy on Labor; hereafter 
CEAL).  In light of evidence obtained during the Assessment, additional allegations were 
added.   
 A six-person WRC Assessment Team conducted on-site gathering of evidence in 
El Salvador from October 26-29 and from November 15-18, 2002.  In addition, members 
of the WRC staff, in support of the Assessment Team, have conducted extensive fact 
finding in El Salvador since late October.   
The Assessment Team members included: the Executive Director and lead 
attorney of one of El Salvador’s leading human rights organizations, an attorney who is a 
former investigator for the Salvadoran Ministry of Labor, a leading Salvadoran 
                                                 
1 Primo appears in factory disclosure data supplied by licensees as “Perry Manufacturing,” the U.S. concern 
that is Primo’s parent company.  Some production buildings at the factory operate under the name “Perry,” 
but, according to company management, they are one and the same company, a fact corroborated by 
publicly available financial data. 
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economist, the Executive Director of the WRC, and the Executive Director and lead 
attorney of a prominent U.S.-based Salvadoran human rights organization.  A list of 
Team members is contained in the Appendix. 
The Team conducted in-depth interviews of 69 persons, including workers, 
supervisors, managers, government officials and officers of domestic NGOs.  The WRC 
also reviewed the employment circumstances and job search history of an additional 109 
workers.  The Team gathered extensive documents and statistics from corporate, union, 
NGO, and government sources, and participated in guided tours of the factory.  The 
Team continues to gather evidence and closely monitor unfolding developments at Primo 
and elsewhere in the San Bartolo free trade zone. 
 
The Allegations to be Assessed by the WRC 
 
The present Report focuses exclusively on the most urgent issue at Primo: the 
allegation that Primo has systematically discriminated in its hiring process against 
workers perceived to be trade unionists (a practice known as “blacklisting”). It is 
important to note that this allegation concerns not just Primo, but factories throughout the 
San Bartolo free trade zone.  Because workers allege that blacklisting is a zone-wide 
phenomenon, the WRC assessed evidence involving other factories in addition to Primo. 
Additional allegations of Code of Conduct violations at Primo will be the focus of 
a subsequent WRC Report.  These involve allegations of mistreatment of workers by 
supervisors, forced and excessive overtime, substandard health care at factory clinics and 
other issues. 
 
The Purpose and Scope of this Preliminary Report 
 
 This Preliminary Report states final conclusions with respect to Primo’s 
compliance with University and College Codes of Conduct in the area of freedom of 
association and makes concrete recommendations for remedial action.  The reason for 
this narrow focus is the gravity of the violations in the area of anti-union discrimination 
that the WRC Assessment Team identified at Primo, targeting former unionized 
employees of a factory called Tainan, a Taiwanese-owned apparel factory that operated 
in the free trade zone until April of 2002, when it effectively shut down.  Under these 
circumstances, immediate action is necessary both to address the impact of past abuses 
and to end ongoing discrimination that threatens irreparable harm to substantial numbers 
of workers.   
 
Sources of Evidence 
 
 The Assessment Team gathered evidence from the following sources: 
 
 Extensive interviews with 53 workers, including 22 ex-Tainan workers who 
applied for work at Primo and were either refused work or were hired and then 
fired within a matter of hours or days; 11 ex-Tainan workers who sought work 
unsuccessfully at other apparel factories in the San Bartolo free trade zone; and 20 
workers currently or recently employed at Primo.  With the exception of four 
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current Primo employees selected by Primo management and interviewed inside 
the factory, all worker interviews were conducted in workers’ homes or other 
locations chosen by workers, and all of these interviews were arranged without 
the knowledge or involvement of factory management. 
 
 Two interviews with Kenny de Ramirez, Primo's Human Resources Director. 
 
 An interview with Daisy Monteagudo, the Primo management employee directly 
in charge of the hiring of production workers at Primo. 
 
 Interviews with three Primo supervisors. 
 
 Research and analysis of the employment status and job-search history of 109 ex-
Tainan workers who were members of the Tainan union. 
 
 Interviews with the Vice-Minister of the Salvadoran Ministry of Labor and Social 
Security (Ministerio de Trabajo y Previsión Social) and other officials of the 
Salvadoran government. 
 
 Interviews with non-governmental human rights and women's organizations with 
knowledge of working conditions at Primo and labor practices in El Salvador’s 
free trade zones, including: Fundación de Estudios para la Aplicación del Derecho 
(FESPAD), Las Melidas and CEAL. 
 
 Interviews with leaders of the Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Industria Textil 
(STIT), the union representing workers at Tainan, and STIT’s parent union, 
Federación de Asociaciones o Sindicatos Independientes de El Salvador 
(FEASIES). 
 
 Collection and review of several categories of documentary evidence, including: 
 
-Personnel files of Primo production workers 
-Files of workers applying for jobs at Primo 
-Documents concerning Primo's hiring policies 
-Documents supplied to job applicants during the hiring process 
-Wage and hour records of Primo production workers 
-Pay stubs of Primo production workers 
 
 Review of reports of the Salvadoran government concerning labor practices and 
compliance with labor law in El Salvador's free trade zones, including a United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID) report released by the 
Salvadoran Ministry of Labor in 2000 and subsequently retracted by the Ministry 
after pressure from Salvadoran employers’ associations.2  Review of U.S. 
                                                 
2 See USAID/ Secretaría Técnica de Financiamiento Externo (SETEFE)/ Ministerio de Trabajo y Previsión 
Social (Ministry of Labor and Social Security), Monitoring Report on the Maquila and Bonded Areas, July 
2000 (translation by National Labor Committee; copy on file with the WRC) 
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government reports concerning human rights and labor rights practices in El 
Salvador. 
 
 An interview with one of the two physicians providing health care services, on-
site, to Primo workers, and a visual inspection of one factory clinic 
 
 Visual inspection of several Primo production buildings, both during and after 
regular work hours 
 
It must be noted that while Primo was initially willing to answer questions and 
share company documents with the WRC, this openness and transparency ended abruptly 
when the WRC asked Primo to discuss the cases of specific job applicants who alleged 
that they had been victims of blacklisting by Primo.  Primo was unwilling to discuss these 
cases or to supply any documents related to these cases and, after these requests were 
made by the WRC, Primo refused to provide any further interviews or information on any 
topic.3  In asking to discuss these workers’ cases, the Assessment Team sought to provide 
Primo with an opportunity to back up its claim that the company had not discriminated, 
by explaining the basis of its decisions not to hire these workers.  In refusing to discuss 
these cases, Primo chose to decline this opportunity. 
 
Assessment of Evidence and Findings with Respect to Alleged Blacklisting 
 
 At least since the discontinuation of operations at the Tainan factory, Primo 
has engaged in the systematic blacklisting of workers who are, or are perceived to 
be, trade unionists.  Evidence gathered by the WRC demonstrates that this 
blacklisting is not limited to Primo, but has also been practiced by a number of 
other factories in the San Bartolo free trade zone. 
 It must be noted that Primo management denies that any blacklisting has taken 
place; however, as explained in this report, the weight of evidence strongly undermines 
this claim. 
 Primo has used a variety of different mechanisms to identify and reject applicants 
with trade union ties, including: demanding that job applicants disclose any union 
affiliation; insisting that workers who had been employed at Tainan provide a letter of 
reference from Tainan management (something Primo management knew that many 
union members had not been able to obtain, and something which Primo does not 
normally require of applicants); asking workers if they had been employed at Tainan and 
then simply rejecting all such applicants (or, more commonly, rejecting those applicants 
                                                 
3 Primo’s Human Resources Director offered a variety of pretextual justifications for the company’s refusal 
to provide the requested information, including 1) that the information, in Primo’s opinion, should have 
been asked for the first time the WRC Assessment Team met with the factory, rather than later in the 
process, 2) that the Assessment Team was late for the meeting at which the information was first requested 
(an erroneous as well as irrelevant claim), and 3) that, in Primo’s opinion, enough information had already 
been provided by the factory and further requests were therefore excessive.  Subsequently, The Human 
Resources Director acknowledged that in refusing to provide the requested information, she was acting on 
the instructions of superiors, who had decided to cease cooperation with the investigative process, for 
reasons she refused to specify.  Primo’s unwillingness to provide information after this juncture was 
reported by the WRC to Lands’ End.   
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who had been employed in the production building at Tainan – called “TS2” – where the 
vast majority of union members worked); and, apparently, consulting a partial list of ex-
Tainan unionists, provided to Primo (and other employers in San Bartolo) either by the 
Salvadoran government or by former Tainan supervisors.  Through these means, Primo 
has been able to identify and exclude most ex-Tainan trade unionists who applied for 
jobs, many of whom were clearly qualified, according to Primo’s self-described hiring 
criteria. 
 This anti-union discrimination violates the provisions of College and University 
Codes of Conduct concerning freedom of association and compliance with domestic law.  
Such anti-union discrimination is explicitly prohibited by Salvadoran law, specifically 
Article 30, Section V of the Salvadoran Codigo de Trabajo (Labor Code), which prohibits 
employers from “…directly or indirectly discriminating against workers based on their 
unionization,” and Article 204, which grants all private sector workers the right to 
freedom of association.   
By denying workers employment for illegal reasons, Primo (and other factories in 
the San Bartolo zone that have engaged in blacklisting) has caused irreparable harm to 
ex-Tainan unionists who have, as a result of this discrimination, been unable to secure 
gainful employment in the work for which they are trained.  Workers, who in many cases 
have been unemployed or underemployed since the suspension of production at Tainan in 
the spring of 2002, have suffered grave financial hardship as a result of this illegal denial 
of employment, including, in some cases, the loss of their homes. Because this 
discrimination is ongoing, immediate remedial action (as outlined at the end of this 
report) is essential to prevent further irreparable harm. 
 
The evidence 
 
 The WRC’s findings concerning blacklisting at Primo are based on the following 
categories of evidence: 
 
 Testimony by Primo management concerning Primo’s hiring criteria and practices 
and the clear contradictions between this testimony and Primo’s actions in the 
cases of job applicants with ties to the STIT union. 
 
 Compelling and mutually corroborative testimony from 22 former Tainan 
unionists who applied for work at Primo and were rejected, including testimony 
concerning specific discriminatory actions and statements of managers at Primo 
who are in charge of the hiring process.   
 
 Detailed information concerning the cases of specific applicants who sought work 
at Primo and were rejected, despite fulfilling all of the requirements of the 
application process and despite possessing the necessary qualifications, according 
to Primo’s self-described hiring criteria. 
 
 Statistical evidence demonstrating that, among a sizable group of Tainan unionists 
whose cases were reviewed, most (including all who are union leaders) were 
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unable to obtain work at Primo or at any other San Bartolo factory, despite the 
fact that all are experienced apparel workers.   
 
The closure of Tainan 
 
Because allegations of recent blacklisting at Primo involve a specific group of 
workers – members of the union at Tainan – it is necessary to review briefly the 
circumstances of Tainan’s closure.   
In the spring of 2002, the aforementioned STIT, a union of garment workers, 
announced that they represented the majority of employees in one of Tainan’s two 
production facilities (called “TS2”) and informed management that they wished to 
proceed with collective bargaining.  (Under Salvadoran law, a union that represents the 
majority of workers in one production building within a larger factory can compel 
management to bargain a contract for workers in that building).  In late April, within 
weeks of STIT’s demand that Tainan bargain, Tainan management suspended production 
at the facility and subsequently laid off the entire workforce. 
While it is not necessary for the purposes of this Report to determine the reasons 
for Tainan’s closure, an understanding of the events at Tainan is useful in developing a 
picture of labor relations in the San Bartolo free trade zone as they pertain to unionism.  
Although Tainan claimed to have shut down due to a lack of orders, there is strong 
evidence that the motivation for the shut down was STIT’s decision to exercise its right 
to bargain a contract.  In addition to the timing of the shutdown, there is the testimony of 
former Tainan workers, describing numerous statements made within the Tainan factory 
by supervisors and managers to the effect that the factory would close as a result of the 
union’s actions.  The workers’ testimony is corroborated by a former Tainan supervisor, 
who stated that it was common knowledge among supervisors that management would 
shut down the factory because of the union.  Of the 230 factories in El Salvador’s free 
trade zones, none has a collective bargaining agreement.  Tainan’s actions appear to be an 
example of how this status quo has been maintained, despite the clear protections for the 
right to organize and bargain in Salvadoran law.  (Tainan has, laudably, begun action 
recently to reopen a small factory in El Salvador4).   
Whatever the cause of Tainan’s shutdown, in late April, Tainan’s workforce, 
including the workers who had joined the STIT union in Tainan TS2, were out of work.  
Many have since sought employment in other apparel factories in the San Bartolo free 
trade zone.  The allegations of blacklisting in the complaint investigated by the WRC 
arise from the treatment of STIT-Tainan unionists, and particularly union leaders, when 
they applied for work at Primo (and at other San Bartolo factories). 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 In a very positive development, Tainan agreed in December of 2002 to reopen in El Salvador, in a 
different facility within the San Bartolo zone.  This commendable step came in response to significant 
expressions of public concern by various groups to Tainan and to Tainan’s largest customer, The GAP.  
Tainan’s reopening, which has not yet occurred, will provide jobs for some ex-Tainan workers, but the 
facility will be much smaller than the one which closed in April.  
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Primo’s official hiring policies 
 
The WRC obtained information from Primo management regarding the 
company’s official hiring policies for production workers.  This information was 
provided by Primo’s Director of Human Resources, Kenny de Ramirez, and by Daisy 
Monteagudo, the member of Ms. de Ramirez’s staff who is directly responsible for 
accepting applications, interviewing applicants, and making most hiring decisions 
(referred to in this report as Primo’s “hiring director”).   
According to the testimony of Ms. de Ramirez and Ms. Monteagudo, Primo’s 
policy is to hire all applicants who provide the required application documents and have 
experience working on at least one of the machines used at Primo5 (virtually all STIT 
unionists meet the second criterion, as a result of their prior employment at Tainan and, 
in many cases, at other factories).  The two women explained that this policy is a result of 
the factory’s frequent need for new employees, a result of the industry’s high turnover 
rates and the large size of the facility.  Ms. Monteagudo, when asked about possible 
reasons for rejecting an applicant, cited only two: 1) failure to provide all required 
documents and, 2) failure to return when called, subsequent to the date of application, to 
fill a newly-opened position.  Thus, according to the testimony of these two officials, 
Primo, in effect, takes all comers: both women agreed that any experienced apparel 
worker who comes to Primo with the required documents in hand will be hired; if there is 
no position open on that day, the worker will be called when a position is available (on a 
first-come, first-served basis).  This is common practice in the garment industry, 
especially at large facilities. 
With respect to the documents required of applicants, two documents are of 
particular relevance: letters of personal reference and letters proving prior employment in 
the industry.  The latter are called “constancias” and are sometimes given by factories to 
departing workers; they merely state that the individual was, in fact, employed at the 
factory.  According to both Ms. de Ramirez and Ms. Monteagudo, Primo does not require 
that workers provide a constancia as a condition of employment.  Instead, Primo offers 
workers the option of providing a personal reference in lieu of a constancia.  Both 
managers were very clear that a constancia is not a requirement, as long as the worker 
can provide the alternate document.  Kenny de Ramirez explained the reason for this: 
factories sometimes fail to provide a constancia to departing workers, so if a constancia 
were a requirement, many qualified workers could not be hired. 
Both women also stated emphatically that hiring decisions are made on the basis 
of the application documents and an interview, and that no further investigation or 
research on a worker’s application is done by Primo. 
Ms. Monteagudo explained another important component of Primo’s employment 
policy: all Primo workers are paid not by check but through direct deposit in a 
Salvadoran bank called Banco Agricola; therefore, after successful job applicants are 
hired, and before they can start work, they are sent to Banco Agricola to open an account, 
                                                 
5According to worker testimony, there is a third requirement for applicants: they must pass a simple 
aptitude test.  It is not clear why Ms. Monteagudo and Ms. Ramirez did not mention this element of the 
application process.  Most workers who testified that they suffered blacklisting reported taking, and 
passing, this aptitude test before being rejected for employment; others report being rejected prior to taking 
the test. 
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unless they already have one.  The factory provides each hiree with a letter to Banco 
Agricola asking the bank to allow the employee to open an account with an initial deposit 
of $1; normally the bank requires a deposit of $25, which is difficult for many workers to 
afford. 
 
Worker testimony 
 
The WRC interviewed 22 workers who allege that they were blacklisted by 
Primo.  The testimony of these workers, describing their subjection to anti-union 
discrimination at Primo, was mutually consistent and corroborative, and highly credible. 
Workers provided detailed descriptions of their experience of the hiring process, and 
these experiences, as described by the applicants, constitute strong evidence of 
blacklisting at Primo.   
Particularly powerful are: workers’ accounts of explicit statements by Primo 
hiring personnel to the effect that unionists and/or ex-Tainan TS2 workers would not be 
hired; workers’ accounts of being asked about their union ties during the hiring process; 
and workers’ descriptions of experiencing a number of hiring practices clearly 
inconsistent with Primo’s self-described policies, as outlined to the WRC by Ms. de 
Ramirez and Ms. Monteagudo.  These accounts are described in more detail below. 
 
The use of “constancias” as a means of anti-union discrimination 
 
Many of the workers interviewed by the WRC stated that, upon presenting their 
applications to Primo, they were told by Primo’s hiring director that in order to be 
accepted for work at Primo, they would have to provide a constancia from their previous 
employer.  Several workers testified that they were told that it was former Tainan 
workers, specifically, who had to provide constancias.  As explained above, the demand 
for a constancia, as an absolute condition of employment, sharply contradicts Primo’s 
self-described hiring policies.  Moreover, current and former employees of Primo 
testified to the WRC, without exception, that they had not been required to supply a 
constancia when applying for work. 
Workers testified that many (though not all) unionists were unable to obtain 
constancias from Tainan management when the factory closed, in some cases because 
these workers rejected Tainan’s severance offer, while non-union workers generally did 
receive constancias.  Thus, requiring a constancia is one means through which some 
STIT unionists could be identified and excluded from employment.   
Several workers testified that, upon asking why they had to have a constancia, 
they were told by Primo’s hiring director that it was known that former Tainan workers 
who did not have constancias were trade unionists.  (In some cases, workers testifying to 
this type of exchange stated that Primo knew that they were ex-Tainan workers because 
they had acknowledged this to Primo, verbally or on their application; others reported 
that they had tried to hide this information, but that the hiring director had identified them 
as Tainan workers nonetheless.)  
Ms. de Ramirez inadvertently provided the WRC with a company document that 
indicates either that Primo changed its policy on constancias during the spring of 2002, 
the time when substantial numbers of ex-Tainan workers were applying for jobs at Primo, 
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or that Primo maintained two different policies on constancias, allowing for the 
application of different policies to different groups of applicants.  The document is a 
small card containing the list of materials job applicants are required to supply to Primo; 
these cards are handed to job applicants when they come to the factory to apply for work.  
According to Ms. de Ramirez, the cards were changed in the spring of 2002 because an 
additional document (unrelated to constancias) had been added to the list.  She testified 
that this was the only change that had been made to the card.  She further testified that the 
card made it clear that constancias were optional, by stating that workers could provide a 
constancia or a personal reference.   
One example of the card shown to the WRC Assessment Team did state these 
requirements in either/or terms.  However, another card shown to the WRC Assessment 
Team on another visit to the factory, and described by Ms. de Ramirez as an example of 
the “new” version dating from spring of 2002, indicated a reversal of the policy with 
respect to constancias.  This card stated that, in order to be hired at Primo, workers had to 
provide a constancia and a personal reference – making constancias mandatory, rather 
than optional.  When the contradiction was pointed out to her, Ms. de Ramirez became 
visibly agitated and stated that this was an error, that this did not reflect Primo’s policy, 
and that the alteration must have been the result of a typographical error.  She then used a 
pen to manually cross out the Spanish word “y” (meaning “and”) on the card and wrote in 
“o” (meaning “or”). 
The consistency and specificity of worker testimony on the issue, the 
contradiction between the hiring policies described by Primo management and the 
experience described by most workers interviewed by the Assessment Team, and Primo 
management’s possession of information cards for job applicants at odds with its stated 
hiring policies, combine to provide strong support for workers’ allegations concerning the 
use of constancias: that Primo, at least at some points and with respect to some workers, 
demanded constancias as a condition of employment, in contradiction to its usual 
policies, as a way of identifying Tainan TS2 unionists for discriminatory purposes. 
 
Explicit statements by Primo hiring personnel that unionists would not be hired 
 
More than half of the workers interviewed by the WRC testified that at some 
point in their interaction with Primo hiring personnel – on the day they first applied, upon 
a second or third application, or upon calling the factory to check on the status of their 
application – they were explicitly told that Primo would not hire unionists and/or would 
not hire former Tainan (or TS2) employees.  In almost every case, according to worker 
interviews, the hiring director was the person who made these statements.  In some cases, 
workers testified that these statements were made after repeated demands by the worker 
that the hiring director explain her reasons for requiring a constancia and/or for rejecting 
their application.  In other cases, workers testified that the statements were made by 
Primo to groups of workers at the beginning of the application process. This testimony 
was credible, detailed and mutually corroborative.  
One worker testified that when she came to apply at Primo there were roughly 20 
workers also soliciting employment.  According to this worker, Ms. Monteagudo 
addressed the group as a whole, asking which factory the workers had been employed at 
previously and then, specifically, whether any of the workers were from Tainan TS2.  
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She then stated, according to the worker, that Primo was not hiring people from TS2 
because these people were unionists and Primo was not going to hire unionists.  After 
hearing this, the worker left, according to her testimony, seeing no reason to continue 
with the application process. 
Another worker testified that when she applied for work at Primo and indicated 
that she had worked at Tainan, she was told by Ms. Monteagudo that she had to provide a 
constancia, which she could not.  She was sent away, but returned again a week later, 
when, according to her testimony, she was recognized by Ms. Monteagudo and told by 
her again that she had to provide a constancia.  Upon replying that she did not have one, 
she quotes Ms. Monteagudo as saying (sarcastically), “How odd” (in Spanish: “Que 
raro”) and then informing her that Primo knew that Tainan workers without constancias 
were unionists.  The worker says that Ms. Monteagudo then demanded to know whether 
she was a unionist, which she denied.  Ms. Monteagudo then reiterated that she could not 
be considered without a constancia and sent her away again. 
A statement made to the WRC Assessment Team by the hiring director, Ms. 
Monteagudo, corroborates this and similar worker testimony.  Ms. Monteagudo claimed 
repeatedly during her interview that Primo does not discriminate against job applicants on 
the basis of union membership. Toward the end of the interview, however, she made a 
statement demonstrating a belief that unionism is not compatible with employment at 
Primo, when asked what she would do in the case of a job applicant to Primo whom she 
knew for a fact had been a unionist at another factory.  She stated that this would not be a 
problem, “as long as they don’t make the same mistake here.”  Under Salvadoran law, a 
job applicant who is a unionist has the same right to employment as a non-union 
applicant, whether or not the unionist intends to continue his or her union activities.   
The belief of the person in charge of hiring at Primo that unionism is a “mistake” 
that would disqualify a person from employment corroborates workers’ allegations 
concerning this same manager’s anti-union statements to job applicants.  This evidence 
further supports the Assessment Team’s conclusion that Primo intended to discriminate, 
and did discriminate, against job applicants who were STIT unionists. 
 
The use of extraordinary investigations of certain applicants’ files as a means of 
anti-union discrimination 
 
Two former STIT-Tainan workers testified that, despite the fact that they did not 
have constancias, their applications were accepted by Primo.  In both of these cases, 
however, Primo’s hiring director told the workers (according to their testimony) that the 
factory could not make an immediate decision on their applications because further 
investigation of their files was necessary.  In both of these cases, the women’s claim that 
they had applied to Primo and that their applications were complete was corroborated by 
Primo company documents.  Both women are experienced sewing machine operators.  
However, according to their testimony, the women were never given work at Primo.  
Primo’s actions, as described in this credible and strongly corroborated testimony, 
contradict two basic tenets of Primo’s self-described hiring policies: 1) that all applicants 
with experience who present a completed application are hired, either then, or as soon as 
a job opens, and 2) that Primo never undertakes “further investigation” of applicant files, 
and that decisions are made exclusively on the basis of the application documents and an 
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interview.  This testimony further supports the conclusion that Primo altered its hiring 
policies in order to justify the rejection of STIT unionists. 
 
A case of the hiring of a leading unionist, followed by immediate dismissal  
 
One of the most significant pieces of evidence in this case is a document that 
proves the central element of one of the most important individual claims of blacklisting 
at Primo.   
As noted above, all Primo workers are paid through direct deposit at the Banco 
Agricola.  Thus, according to the testimony of the hiring director, all hirees who do not 
have a bank account are sent to open one upon being hired.   
In the fall of 20026, according to her testimony, a leader of the STIT union at 
Tainan applied for work at Primo.  She testified that the hiring director, after receiving 
her application (in which she did not acknowledge having worked at Tainan), told her 
that the factory needed five workers immediately and that she was hired and would start 
working that day.  She was then told, according to her testimony, to go to the Banco 
Agricola to open an account and was given a letter from Primo asking the bank to allow 
her to open the account with a deposit of $1, as was consistent with Primo’s hiring policy.  
She further testifies that, upon her return from the bank, she was told that she could not 
begin work after all because Primo needed to do “further investigation” of her file and 
that she would be called by the factory in the near future.  The union leader testified that 
she was never called and that, after contacting the hiring director multiple times, she was 
finally told by the hiring director that Primo knew she was an official of the Tainan union 
and therefore could she not work at the company.   
The union leader provided the Assessment Team with documentary proof that she 
was, in fact, hired by Primo as she claims: she provided the Team with a letter from 
Primo to Banco Agricola asking the bank to allow her to open an account with a $1 
deposit, and a bank book demonstrating that the account had been opened on the same 
day.  Other evidence shows that, despite having been hired, she never began work at the 
factory.   
Under Primo’s self-described hiring policies, there is no valid reason why a 
worker qualified enough to have been hired initially would 1) have her job offer 
rescinded hours later and 2) never be offered work at the factory.  Even if the factory 
were to have determined after making the hire that there was no immediate job opening, 
the worker, according to Primo’s policy, would have been hired for the next available 
opening.  This never occurred. 
As noted earlier in this report, when the WRC Assessment Team asked Primo to 
discuss this specific case, and the cases of several other specific workers who allege that 
they were blacklisted, Primo refused and, at that point, ceased to cooperate with the 
Assessment Team.  
The documentary and testimonial evidence in this union leader’s case provides a 
high degree of corroboration of her claim to have been blacklisted.  The most plausible 
explanation for the pattern of known facts is that Primo made a spur-of-the-moment 
decision to hire the union leader without checking her background – because they were 
                                                 
6 The exact date is known to the WRC, as are additional details that we cannot include in this account 
because they could serve to identify the worker involved. 
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short-staffed and because she was highly qualified – and then reversed their decision 
upon discovering that they had hired a leader of the STIT union.  Primo provided no 
evidence to contradict the union leader’s claim. 
 
Statistical evidence of anti-union discrimination in hiring 
 
A statistical analysis by the Assessment Team of the actual job search history of 
the STIT union leadership, and of STIT unionists in general, corroborates the testimonial 
and documentary evidence cited above. 
The WRC obtained information on the post-Tainan job search and employment 
history of a total of 109 Tainan unionists.  Of this group, there were 61 workers who 
sought work at one or more apparel factories in the San Bartolo free trade zone and for 
whom the Assessment Team was able obtain specific information as to where they had 
applied.  Thirty of these workers had applied at Primo.   
Of these 30 applicants to Primo, only four were hired; of these four, two were 
gone from the factory within a week. (One was fired, the other resigned after being told 
by her supervisor that she would shortly be fired).  Thus, of 30 union applicants to Primo 
– a factory that claims to hire all applicants who meet minimal qualification standards – 
only two were hired and retained for more than a week. 
Of the larger group of applicants to other factories in the San Bartolo free trade 
zone, seven succeeded in obtaining a position at an apparel factory in the zone, while 54 
were rejected at every factory where they applied, or were hired and then fired in short 
order. (It is known that some of the workers who obtained positions hid their Tainan 
and/or union ties at the time of application.)  Thus, looking at the San Bartolo zone as a 
whole, less than one in eight among this group of STIT unionists – all experienced 
apparel workers who had been hired by other factories in the past – were able to obtain 
apparel jobs in the eight months between Tainan’s closure and the time of the WRC’s 
survey.   
Given the nature of employee turnover in the apparel industry, which leads to a 
frequent (and in the case of large factories like Primo, nearly constant) need for new 
qualified workers, and given the amount of time that has passed since these workers first 
began seeking new jobs in the aftermath of the suspension of work at Tainan, these 
success rates are far too low to be explained as a function of normal hiring patterns.  
Indeed, absent hiring discrimination, most or all of these workers should have had 
success obtaining employment in the industry within a relatively short time after Tainan’s 
closure.  An illustration of this reality was provided by the testimony of one union 
worker: she alleged that when she was rejected for employment at one San Bartolo 
factory, the factory hired every one of the 11 other women who applied at the same time. 
 The WRC also obtained information on the post-Tainan job search and work 
history of seven of the nine senior leaders of the Tainan-TS2 union (two other leaders, 
both of whom had resigned from the union, could not be found).  According to the Primo 
complaint, these leaders were the target of the most intensive blacklisting, including, 
workers allege, being denied access, in most instances, to the entire San Bartolo zone in 
the first two months after the shutdown of Tainan.  All seven of these leaders sought 
work at Primo, at various times, and, according to their testimony, provided Primo with 
all of the required application documents, as defined in Primo’s self-described hiring 
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policies. (In one case, this was verified by an examination of the worker’s application file 
at Primo; Primo management refused to allow the WRC investigative team to review the 
files of the other applicants.)7   
Of these seven applicants, all highly qualified according to Primo’s hiring criteria, 
five were rejected outright.  Of the remaining two, one was hired and then told two hours 
later, as noted above, that she did not have a job because of a need to “further 
investigate” her application; she was subsequently told she had been rejected.  The 
seventh (who testified that she did not disclose her Tainan association during the 
application process) was hired and then terminated four days later, after a fight with 
another worker who, according to eyewitness testimony, had denounced the fired worker 
as a unionist.  All seven also sought work, unsuccessfully, at other apparel factories in the 
San Bartolo zone (in a few cases, according to their testimony, these workers were hired 
at one of these other factories and then fired within hours or days, after being told by 
management that they had been identified as unionists).  Thus, of those members of the 
top STIT union leadership about whom the WRC was able to obtain information, all 
sought work at Primo and at other San Bartolo factories and none were able to obtain 
(and retain) positions. 
The data summarized above show that, among a sizable group of ex-Tainan 
unionists, all of whom are qualified apparel workers, most were unable to find work at 
Primo, and in San Bartolo in general, over an extended period of time. The data also 
show that the high-profile union leaders the WRC interviewed were, without exception, 
denied employment, despite having solicited work at multiple factories.  Other former 
STIT-Tainan unionists may have fared somewhat better (or worse).8  However, the closed 
door experienced by most of the STIT-Tainan unionists whose circumstances are known, 
and reviewed above, is more than sufficient to demonstrate the use of discriminatory 
hiring practices by Primo and other San Bartolo factories.  This aggregate data, with 
respect to STIT leaders as well as the STIT rank-and-file, lends strong corroboration to 
the testimony of individual workers and the other evidence cited in this report. 
 
Salvadoran Labor Ministry report citing widespread blacklisting 
 
In December of 1999, USAID provided funding for the Salvadoran Ministry of Labor to 
establish the Labor Relations Monitoring and Analysis Unit, whose purpose was to assess 
and monitor working conditions and industrial relations in El Salvador’s free trade zones.  
For four months, the unit’s researchers investigated conditions in the four largest free 
trade zones in El Salvador, including San Bartolo, where Primo is located.  Together, 
these four zones accounted, at that time, for 80% of El Salvador’s export production.  
                                                 
7 The WRC was able to review this file – that of Maria Deysi Hernandez – because it was in a large group 
of files provided to the WRC by Primo management in response to a general request to view examples of 
files of recent job applicants.  Primo refused all requests to view the files of specified applicants. 
8 There are a substantial number of other former STIT-Tainan unionists whose present employment 
circumstances are not known in detail to the WRC.  It is possible that among this group, a larger percentage 
of workers had success obtaining employment in apparel factories in San Bartolo (including Primo), or in 
other free trade zones.  As discussed at greater length later in this report, blacklisting, as it has been 
practiced in San Bartolo factories, is not uniform in its application and is not always effective when it is 
applied (for example, workers, most of whom are aware of blacklisting, can sometimes be effective in 
hiding union ties).   
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These researchers enjoyed easy access to the free trade zone factories, because the Labor 
Ministry was viewed as highly sympathetic to the views and interests of industry. 
In August 2000, a report was released outlining the Unit’s findings with respect to 
working conditions and labor practices in the free trade zones.9  The report documented a 
wide range of severe, chronic labor law violations and a history of non-enforcement of 
law by the Ministry of Labor.  With respect to freedom of association and blacklisting, 
the report stated the following: 
The issue of freedom to unionize is definitely one of the areas in which the 
rights of workers are frequently violated… One of the situations that most 
caught the attention during the visits was the fact that the rate of unionization 
in the [free trade zones] is very low… on investigating the reasons for this 
phenomenon, it was found that there exists an anti-union policy in the 
maquilas, by which any attempt at organization is repressed… 
The workers stated that one of the principle anti-union policies consists of the 
management of ‘blacklists’ of the names of workers who belong, or at some 
point have belonged, to a union organization. The workers affirm that the 
people who appear on these lists are not hired by the maquila companies, 
which constitutes a flagrant violation of freedom to unionize recognized in 
our judicial order, the constitution of the Republic, as well as secondary labor 
legislation (emphasis added). 
Upon release of this report, severe pressure was brought to bear on the Ministry of Labor 
by factory operators and business associations.  The report was retracted one day after its 
release.  The report remains the most credible official assessment to date of labor 
practices in El Salvador’s free trade zones. 
The U.S. government has also identified blacklisting as a problem in El Salvador.  
The most recent Country Report on Human Rights Practices issued by the U.S. State 
Department cites “instances of employers using illegal pressure to discourage organizing, 
including the dismissal of labor activists and the maintenance of lists of workers who 
would not be hired because they had belonged to unions.” (emphasis added).10  The 
report cites weaknesses in labor law and enforcement as a significant problem, noting, for 
example, that while Salvadoran law prohibits the firing of union leaders, it does not 
require the reinstatement of those who are fired.  (In an interview with the WRC 
Assessment Team, a senior official of the Salvadoran Ministry of Labor acknowledged 
that the Salvadoran government did not levy a single fine for a labor code violation in the 
free trade zones in the last year).  The report also cites the absence of any collective 
bargaining agreements in the free trade zones.   
The anti-union discrimination at Primo and at other San Bartolo factories 
identified by the WRC Assessment Team is consistent with the types of practices 
documented by the Ministry of Labor in its 2000 report and by the U.S. State 
Department, a fact which lends further weight to the WRC Assessment Team’s findings. 
 
                                                 
9 USAID/ SETEFE/ Ministry of Labor 
10 US Department of State (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor), Country Reports on Human 
Rights Practices, 2001: El Salvador, March 4, 2002 
 15
Blacklisting may not be practiced, or practiced successfully, in all cases 
 
It is important to note that the Primo complaint does not allege, and the evidence 
does not show, that Primo’s general policy of anti-union discrimination, and 
discrimination against Tainan unionists in particular, was applied successfully in every 
case or, when it was applied, that it always involved the same methods and tactics.  The 
evidence shows that: 
 
 Many ex-Tainan workers sought to hide their Tainan TS2 and/or STIT 
connections, some of them successfully. 
   
 Primo, in its efforts to exclude Tainan workers, frequently made a distinction 
between workers who had been in TS2, the unionized production building at 
Tainan, and workers who had been in TS1, the other production building, where 
most workers were not union members.  
 
 Primo did not always correctly identify applicants as Tainan TS2 workers and/or 
as unionists.11  
 
 Primo’s blacklisting – particularly the demand for constancias – was applied less 
systematically in the months after the initial influx of Tainan applicants had 
ended. 
 
As a result, it appears that Primo did hire a significant number of ex-Tainan applicants, 
the majority non-union workers. The factory also hired a small number of Tainan 
unionists (some of whom were fired or had their job offers withdrawn as soon as their 
identity was discovered).12  
The fact that Primo’s policy of discrimination was not applied with complete 
effectiveness, or consistency, does not bear on the central question of whether the policy 
exists and whether it is a violation of Salvadoran law and University and College Codes 
of Conduct.  The Assessment Team documented acts of discrimination against numerous 
specific job applicants and the existence of an overall policy and practice of 
discrimination.  These acts and practices are illegal, although they did not occur with 
respect to every job applicant at Primo. 
 
                                                 
11 Gaps in effectiveness of Primo’s blacklisting reflect the decision of some applicants to hide their Tainan 
and/or union ties.  The gaps also reflect the fact that although Primo apparently had access to a list of STIT 
union leaders, many rank-and-file STIT members could only be identified, absent self-identification, 
through such imperfect screens as the lack of a constancia or through identification of these unionists by 
former co-workers who either applied at Primo with them, or were already working at Primo.  
12 The Assessment Team could not determine how many former Tainan employees are presently working at 
Primo or, of more importance, how many such employees were members of the STIT-Tainan union.  Primo 
management claimed that the factory employs roughly 120 ex-Tainan workers but refused to provide the 
Assessment Team with a list of these employees.  The Team did identify, through other research, two 
former Tainan-STIT unionists who did obtain positions at Primo, as well as 28 unionists who were rejected. 
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Blacklisting as a free trade zone-wide and nation-wide problem 
 
 While Primo, as the subject of the present complaint, is the primary focus of this 
Report, it is clear from the Assessment Team’s investigation that anti-union 
discrimination in hiring is not a phenomenon limited to this one factory.  The Team 
documented blacklisting against STIT unionists at four other San Bartolo factories and 
evidence suggests that all apparel factories in the zone have engaged in some degree of 
discrimination against this group of individuals.   This evidence includes detailed 
testimony from workers who report statements and actions by hiring managers at these 
other factories similar to those reported by workers who applied at Tainan, including 
explicit statements that workers from Tainan and/or workers who are unionists were not 
welcome.  A number of workers reported being hired at one of these factories – after, 
they stated, successfully hiding their union connections from hiring managers – and then 
being fired within hours or days by managers who, according to these workers’ 
testimony, explicitly stated that they were being fired because their union connection had 
been exposed.  One worker reported being hired at one of these factories and then, on her 
second day of work, being summoned to the Human Resources office where, she 
testified, she was told that she could not work at the factory because she was a unionist 
and that her name was on a list.  The worker stated that the Human Resources manger 
who fired her then showed her where her name appeared on a list on this manager’s 
computer screen.     
Significantly, credible worker testimony also implicates the administration of the 
San Bartolo free trade zone in anti-union discrimination.  Specifically, workers allege 
that, in the immediate aftermath of the suspension of production at Tainan, top leaders of 
the STIT union were routinely denied entry to the San Bartolo zone as a whole.  
According to this testimony, zone security told these leaders that they had been ordered 
by their superiors to deny the leaders entry; workers also testified that pictures of some 
union leaders were posted inside zone gatehouses.  San Bartolo, like other Salvadoran 
free trade zones, operates under the authority of the Salvadoran government.  Relevant 
government officials refused to answer questions concerning this issue. 
More broadly, worker testimony, as well as the above-cited Salvadoran and U.S. 
government reports, show that the practice of blacklisting affects other Salvadoran free 
trade zones beyond San Bartolo and is, in fact, a national problem. 
The fact that anti-union discrimination is a zone-wide and national phenomenon 
does not, of course, excuse the practices of Primo or reduce the obligation of the 
licensee, Lands’ End, to act to end the factory’s serious violations of University and 
College Codes of Conduct.  The zone-wide and national nature of the problem does mean 
that not just Primo, but all licensees sourcing from San Bartolo, and from El Salvador in 
general, have an obligation to scrutinize their suppliers’ practices and to require their 
suppliers to implement preventative measures against possible discriminatory policies 
and practices.  The WRC’s remedial recommendations on this issue, outlined below, are 
therefore applicable not only to Lands’ End and Primo, but to other collegiate licensees 
sourcing from El Salvador and to their supplier factories. 
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Accordingly, the WRC is contacting all collegiate licensees who source, or have 
recently sourced, from Salvadoran factories to make remedial recommendations.13  In 
addition, the WRC has recommended to the Fair Labor Association (FLA) that all FLA 
brands adopt such policies. 
 
Harm to workers 
 
Numerous STIT-Tainan unionists have suffered hardship as a result of illegal 
discrimination by Primo and other factories in the San Bartolo free trade zone.  For most 
of these workers, apparel work is the only kind of industrial work for which they are 
trained and is, by far, the most viable source of income for themselves and their families.  
These workers have been denied any employment in this industry for over 10 months, as 
a result of blacklisting by Primo and other San Bartolo companies; in nearly every case, 
these workers have been unable to find alternate employment that provides income 
anywhere near what they would earn in San Bartolo.  The direct consequences of this 
financial blow include the loss of homes, the shortage of food for workers and their 
families, including minor children, and the inability of workers to pay their children’s 
school fees.  Obviously, in addition to the financial burden, such discrimination also 
exacts a substantial psychological toll, a fact attested to by numerous interviewees.   
This ongoing, and in some cases irreparable, harm is the central reason why 
urgent action is needed to ensure that workers qualified for employment are protected 
from further illegal discrimination. 
 
Recommendations for Remedial Action 
 
 
                                                
In order to remedy past anti-union discrimination in the hiring process and 
prevent future discrimination, Lands’ End should require of its supplier each of the 
actions enumerated below, on an immediate basis.   
 
1) Primo should refrain from any anti-union discrimination in the hiring process and 
instruct all personnel involved in any way with the hiring process that non-
discrimination is official company policy and that deviation from this policy will 
not be tolerated. 
 
2) Primo should produce a written public statement to the effect that the factory 
welcomes applications from all qualified workers, including those who may have 
solicited work unsuccessfully in past, and is committed to a policy of non-
discrimination and fairness in hiring, consistent with Salvadoran law.  Such a 
statement is necessary if discouraged workers who have been victims of past 
discrimination are to be convinced that there is reason to expect fair treatment 
upon re-application for work at Primo. 
 
3) Primo should provide all rejected job applicants with a clear, written explanation 
of the reasons they were not hired.  Primo should keep a record of the application 
 
13 An example of the WRC’s letter to these licensees available on the WRC’s website at 
http://www.workersrights.org/freports.asp  
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file of every person who solicits work, containing application forms, supporting 
documents, graded aptitude tests, and, if the worker was rejected, a copy of the 
written explanation of the reasons for rejection.  These records should be retained 
for a minimum of three years and should be available for inspection by factory 
monitors. 
 
4) Primo should maintain and adhere to clear and equitable hiring policies and 
should provide a written explanation of these policies to all applicants.  The 
factory should make no change to its official hiring policies as outlined to the 
WRC Assessment Team, but should apply these policies faithfully and without 
variation among different applicants. These policies are: 1) no requirement that 
applicants provide a constancia/letter of reference from previous employers, as 
long as the worker can supply a personal reference as an alternative; 2) no extra 
investigation of any applicant's file that would delay decisions on complete 
applications beyond the day of the interview; 3) offering job openings to qualified 
applicants on a first-come, first-served basis, such that if workers are qualified, 
but no job is available, such workers are called for subsequent openings in the 
order in which they applied for work; and 4) offering positions to all applicants 
who provide the required documents, have experience on at least one of the 
production machines used at Primo, and pass the aptitude test that Primo has been 
using over the last year.   
 
5) Primo should agree that for successful future applicants who had also applied 
during the last 12 months and were rejected, the date of their original application 
will be the date used for determining priority for jobs that come open.  For 
example, an applicant who applied last June and was rejected, and applies again 
next month and is deemed qualified, but cannot be hired right away because there 
is no opening, should be placed in line for future openings ahead of any workers 
who are applying for the first time this year.  This policy ensures that those 
applicants who have been unfairly rejected in the past and are accepted in the 
future will experience less additional delay in obtaining employment. 
 
6) In addition Primo should act immediately to hire those previously rejected 
applicants who have provided detailed evidence directly to the WRC that they 
were victims of anti-union discrimination and who are still interested in working 
at Primo.  Their names will not be listed in this report, for reasons of 
confidentiality, but, with the workers’ permission, the names can be provided to 
Primo by the WRC.  This approach would be the fastest and most equitable 
remedy with respect to the discrimination experienced by these workers. 
 
In addition, Lands’ End should: 
 
1) Issue a public statement to the effect that the Lands’ End will not tolerate any 
blacklisting or other anti-union discrimination on the part of suppliers in El 
Salvador.  This statement should be in writing, so that it can be circulated in El 
Salvador in government, labor and business circles. 
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2) Communicate to El Salvador’s Ministerio de Economía (Ministry of the 
Economy), the governing authority for all Salvadoran free trade zones, the 
company’s opposition to blacklisting and any other form of illegal anti-union 
discrimination.  Ask the Ministry to make it clear to all zone administrative and 
security personnel that blacklisting is a violation of Salvadoran law and will not 
be tolerated. 
 
3) Support the appointment of an ombudsman, chosen jointly by the WRC and the 
FLA, to receive and resolve complaints of anti-union discrimination from workers 
and to visit the factory on an unannounced basis to monitor the hiring process.  
This person must be able to visit as frequently as s/he deems necessary and must 
have full access to the application process, including the ability to sit in on job 
interviews, talk with applicants and review applicants' files.  The ombudsman 
should issue regular public reports summarizing the content and disposition of 
complaints. 
 
As noted, the focus of the present report is Primo.  However, because the problem of 
blacklisting is zone-wide and national in scope, the WRC believes that all College and 
University licensees (and indeed, all buyers) that source from El Salvador should act 
immediately to implement the above recommendations.  This is of particular urgency 
with respect to buyers sourcing from factories in the San Bartolo free trade zone.  
 
The Response of Licensees 
 
The WRC provided a summary of its findings to Lands’ End well in advance of 
the publication of this Report and asked Lands’ End to support the necessary remedial 
action at Primo.  To date, despite extensive discussion and exchange of information, 
Lands’ End has not been willing to do so, stating that the WRC has not provided them 
with sufficient evidence of blacklisting to warrant action.  Lands’ End stated in a letter on 
March 13 that they “are working to improve and correct any situations [at Primo] that are 
in violation of the Lands’ End standards of business conduct."  However, in this same 
letter, Lands’ End reiterated that they do not accept the WRC’s findings of ongoing 
blacklisting and cannot support the remedial action the WRC has recommended.  
Although the WRC originally reported concerns about blacklisting to Lands’ End in 
January, the company has, to date, provided no information, beyond the sentence quoted 
above, as to what if any problems they do acknowledge and what action they are taking. 
We are very concerned about the company’s failure to act against the discriminatory 
practices that are ongoing at Primo and we continue to hope that Lands’ End will reverse 
its position.  The WRC remains ready and eager to work in cooperation with Lands’ End 
to improve respect for worker rights and University and College Codes of Conduct at 
Primo; we remain hopeful that this will be feasible. 
The WRC has also asked the FLA and its member brands that source from El 
Salvador to agree to take action to prevent blacklisting at all of their Salvadoran supplier 
factories.  It is the WRC’s understanding that discussions are underway among these 
brands and that an agreement is likely that would create an FLA-wide policy, supported 
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by the major brands, to address blacklisting in El Salvador.  This policy would require all 
Salvadoran factories supplying collegiate licensees and non-collegiate FLA brands to 
implement a set of concrete preventative measures.   If such a policy is created, and is 
sufficiently strong and transparent to be effective, it would be a huge stride toward 
respect for associational rights in El Salvador.   
As noted earlier, in addition to this communication through the FLA, the WRC is 
also directly contacting all collegiate licensees who, according to WRC disclosure data, 
are sourcing from El Salvador. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
Members of WRC Assessment Team for Primo S.A. de C.V. 
 
María Silvia Guillén  
Executive Director of Fundación de Estudio Para la Aplicación del Derecho (Foundation 
for the Study of the Application of Law), an organization for human rights and civil 
rights in El Salvador. 
 
Richard Mendez  
Executive Director of El Rescate, a human rights and civil rights organization based in 
Los Angeles focusing on human rights issues affecting Salvadorans, both in El Salvador 
and in the United States. 
 
Raul Moreno  
Professor of Economics at the National University of El Salvador and president of the 
Centro para la Defensa del Consumidor (Center for the Defense of the Consumer). 
 
Scott Nova  
WRC Executive Director. 
 
Roberto Burgos Viale  
An attorney with Foundation of Studies for the Application of Law (FESPAD) during the 
investigation, and now an attorney at the Institute of Human Rights at the Universidad 
Centroamericana, Mr. Burgos is an expert on Salvadoran labor law and its enforcement.  
A former investigator at the El Salvadoran Ministry of Labor, in 2000 he co-authored a 
key report, funded by USAID, on working conditions and labor law enforcement in El 
Salvador's free trade zones. 
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